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Those Still Elusive Neutral Principles-
A Further Groping
Elliott M. Abramson*
In their The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,'
Miller and Howell dispute the normative thrust of Professor Herbert
Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law2 as im-
possible of human attainment. The core of Wechsler's position is:
the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved. . . . [M]ust
[the courts] not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and
generality, tested not only by the instant application but by others
that the principles imply?3
Miller and Howell respond:
consistent teaching of . . respected observers is that neutrality...
is not attainable ... knowledge . . . is primarily decisional in na-
ture. This means that the human agency cannot be eliminated
from any subject to which man addresses his attention, that value
preferences inescapably intrude to guide decisions made among
competing alternatives. Professor Wechsler agrees that a judge
must make a choice among conflicting values, but maintains that
such a choice itself can be guided by adherence to neutral prin-
ciples. This we deny .... 4
And in summarizing the observations of thinkers from other disci-
plines into a synthesis with which to solidly confront Wechsler's quest
for chimera, Miller and Howell further assert:
choices among values are unavoidable in human knowledge and
human activity; and . . . when those choices are made, they are
motivated not by neutral principles or objective criteria but by
A.B. Columbia College, LL.B. Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor of Law,
Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles.
1. Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. Cm. L. REV. 661 (1960).
2. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAIv. L. REV. 1
(1959).
3. Id. at 15.
4. Miller and Howell, supra note 1, at 665.
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the entire biography and heredity of the individual making them.
In making choices among competing values, the Justices of the
Supreme Court are themselves guided by value preferences. Any
reference to neutral or impersonal principles is, accordingly, little
more than a call for a return to a mechanistic jurisprudence and
for a jurisprudence of nondisclosure as well as an attempted
denial of the teleological aspects of any decision, wherever made.5
At this point it seems appropriate to inquire whether what Miller
and Howell have proven, or re-stated, viz, that human beings engaged
in decision making are intensely influenced by their Value preferences,6
confutes what Wechsler proposes. Cannot Wechsler be understood to
mean that principles inescapably influenced by values should never-
theless be consistently applied, and account taken of long range, rather
than merely short range or immediate, (the case at hand), consequences?
Indisputably a judge's decision as to whether a particular literary ex-
pression is protected by the First Amendment, or falls beyond the
shield of free speech because hard-core pornography, may, inevitably, be
at least partially, conditioned by such factors as his training in litera-
ture, the position of his church on such matters, in conjunction with his
relationship to his church, what his parents told him many years ago
about "dirty books," etc. Yet it is nevertheless appropriate to expect
the principle which he fashions to decide the status of the disputed
expression to be totally independent of the fact that the expression
appears in poetic rather than prose form. Or, to put the matter another
way, if the judge decides that the words "x,y,z" expressed in the con-
text of a prose work are not merely "pornographic" it would be rea-
5. Id. at 671. Further elaboration of this theme comes at 690 of the article:
In the annals of American constitutional adjudication, those men we call the
great judges have habitually analyzed and thought in terms of consequences. Al-
though their decisions are often couched in terms of adherence to "the law," never-
theless to some degree they have been engaging in operational thinking. In the main,
we are suggesting in this paper that operational thinking become the outward rule
rather than the hidden actuality.
6. To illustrate the way values essentially irrelevant to the making of a rational de-
cision in some area nevertheless intrude upon the decision maker's efforts Miller &
Howell, supra note 1, at 670, quote from I. BmLIN, HISTORICAL INEVITABLITY at 35-36
(1954):
the scope of human choice is a good deal more limited than we used to sup-
pose; ... the evidence at our disposal shows that many of the acts. too often assumed
to be within the individual's control are not so . . . that human beings more often
than not act as they do because of characteristics due to heredity or physical or
social environment or education, or biological laws of physical characteristics or the
interplay of these factors with each other. . . .And this certainly alters our ideas
about the limits of freedom and responsibility.
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sonable to expect his determination to be sufficiently general so that
one could rely on his reaching the same result if "x,y,z" appeared in a
poem, notwithstanding his hatred of poetry. Thus, while his reaction
to whether "x,y,z" is pornographic would be a composite of many value
determinants, the final assessment of "x,y,z" in one particular literary
genre might reasonably be relied upon as objective enough to control
the outcome in a somewhat different context, regardless of the decision
maker's feelings about each of the contexts themselves. As stated by
Wechsler:
must . . . not [courts] decide [cases] on grounds of adequate neu-
trality and generality, tested not only by the instant application
but by others that the principles imply? Is it not the very essence
of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other cases,
preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating.
any principle avowed?7
Of course, it may be asserted that one's relative preference vis A vis
:prose and poetry is itself a value determinant which in some cases
could be the deciding factor. To so assert, it might be said, is to extend
the general proposition that decision making is intensely value influ-
enced. But to extend so far is to perhaps destroy the point thereby
made; i.e. a literal nth degree application of Miller and Howell's posi-
tion may generate its own destruction while tearing down Wechsler's
aspiration. If each decision is totally ad hoc in the sense that any
particular value factor in the situation may be decisive, of what use is
it to, as Miller and Howell suggest, articulate general value predicates
in the hope of rationalizing and making manifest the true origins of
the decisions spawned by such predicates?
In the main, we are suggesting . . . that operational thinking be-
come the outward rule, rather than the hidden actuality.
Hence we suggest that judicial decisions should be gauged by
their results and not by either their coincidence with a set of
allegedly consistent doctrinal principles or by an impossible refer-
ence to neutrality of principle. The effects ... of a decision should
be weighed and the consequences assessed in terms of their social
adequacy. Alternatives of choice are to be considered, not so much
in terms of who the litigants are or what the issue is, but rather in
terms of the realization or non-realization of stated societal values
.... [J]udges have always done this . . . overtly or covertly . ..
[and] now it should become a matter of conscious choice.... Dis-
7. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 15.
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putes are and should avowedly be settled in terms of the external
consequences of their application .... 8
But if Wechsler agrees that values influence decisions 9 and Miller
and Howell assent to the norm that those values which decide cases
must be broad ("stated societal values") rather than narrow ("who the
litigants are"; one is negro, one is caucasian), does Wechsler's insistence
on keeping the breadth of the applicable principles in mind (free
speech is free for poems as well as prose) really conflict with the pre-
scriptions of Miller and Howell? Do not both sides opt for even handed
application of socially beneficient principles, and urge the sacrifice of
immediate values of very narrow scope (personal whim-"I can't stand
poetry") in behalf of the broader causes? A solipsistic position turns
out to be as generally disparaged by lawyers as discredited among
philosophers.
However, assuming Miller and Howell are urging a position distin-
guishable from what they regard as Wechsler's exercise in phantasma-
goria, it is perhaps instructive to take them at their word. If human
decision makers, interpreters, and the like are indeed pervasively value
directed, does this mean it is necessarily totally inapposite to speak of
"objectivity" or "neutrality" respecting the decision making process.
This question would seem particularly crucial where the decision
maker is compelled to validate the decision he actually arrives at, at
least to some extent, on the basis of his interpretation of an expression
of values formulated by another, or others. Such a situation arises
clearly when a set of facts is measured against the words of a statute
for the purpose of determining whether the fact complex is one spoken
of by the statute in the sense that the consequences mandated by the
statute, in case it is, must follow. If the statute says that a corporation
may not pay dividends except out of earned surplus, and if a corpora-
tion in operation for three years, and having lost $10,000 in each of the
first two years, but having made $10,000 in the third year, pays out
dividends amounting, in toto, to $10,000 and is challenged by one of
its shareholders for having violated the statute, a judge will have to
decide whether "earned surplus" is to be thought of in terms of the
entire life of the business or whether it may be construed as referring
merely to any year's profit and loss statement.
Classically, the judge is conceived of as obliged to strive to ascertain
8. Miller and Howell, supra note 1, at 690-91.
9. See supra, note 4, and accompanying text.
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how the legislature used the words when it wrote the statute. (Whether
it is meaningful to speak of a legislature using words or having an
intent is itself a question of the utmost independent complexity and
difficulty.' 0 In what follows it will be assumed that the meaning and
intention of the author(s) of an arrangement," expressive of value
preferences, which comes under judicial interpretation, are in some
way rationally definable.) 12 Presumably this responsibility arises from
the similarly classical conception of the legislature in a democratic
society as being principally charged with making the laws while the
judiciary is chiefly concerned with the interpretation and application
of those laws in specific factual contexts.
Perhaps a short aside on the concept, and its validity, is in order.
For if the division of responsibility proclaimed by the theory is not
desirable or wise, there need be no concern whatsoever with whether
judges are accurately interpreting legislators or merely ventilating
their own ideas about what society needs. If judges are as entitled as
legislators to select values what does it matter if they plumb legislative
language with fidelity or suspend the law makers' judgment by inserting
their own predilections into the web of society's arrangements?
It is submitted that in a democracy adherence to the division of
responsibility limned by the classical theory is appropriate if govern-
ment, not merely by the consent, but by the direction of the governed,
is regarded as a genuinely important desideratum. If those who func-
tion under the arrangements of a society are entitled to participate in
the formulation, adjustment, and reappraisal of those arrangements
via the election of representatives whose function it is to craft and enact
such arrangements, only arrangements so created bear the seal of legiti-
macy.
John Dewey expressed the notion with graceful intensity:
The keynote of democracy ... may be expressed ... as the neces-
10. See, e.g. Bishin, The Law Finders, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1965).
11. The terminology connoting a legislative enactment as a verbal formulation in-
tended to direct and arrange human activity in some way or another is suggested by
HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROC.ss 124-206 (tent. ed. 1958); and passim.
12. Even if the legislative "intention" in the sense of unitary, unequivocal meaning
may not be derivable from the language of a statute, it does seem fair to conceive of
certain interpretations as sufficiently reasonable to be permissible and to regard all others
as so implausible as to be impermissible. Objectivity of approach could serve in delineat-
ing the demarcation. Naturally even after such delineation the problem of choosing
amongst the plausible alternatives remains, as well as the problem of whether there is
need to make a single hard and fast choice. Yet, again, in narrowing down to the sub-set
of those choices more likely to be correspondent with legislative thrust, from the general
category of all reasonably possible choices, objectivity may wisely inform discretion.
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sity for the participation of every mature human being in forma-.
tion of the values that regulate the living of men together....
Democratic political forms are simply the best means that human
wit has devised up to a special time in history. But they rest back
upon the idea that no man or limited set of men is wise enough to
rule others without their consent; the positive meaning of this
statement is that all those who are affected by social institutions
must have a share in producing and managing them. The two facts
that each one is influenced in what he does and enjoys and in what
he becomes by the institutions under which he lives, and that
therefore he shall have, in a democracy, a voice in shaping them,
are the passive and active sides of the same fact.
The individuals of the submerged mass may not be very wise. But
there is one thing they are wiser about than anybody else can be,
and that is where the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from.13
From this perspective, abrogation or modification of authoritative,
legislatively prepared arrangements, as distinguished from a faithful
application thereof, represents a usurpation of power; a fashioning of
collective living procedures by those not certified by the electoral pro-
cess as acceptable for the undertaking' 4
But even if it is postulated as vital to a democratic society, that the
decision making law interpreter strive to faithfully comprehend the
meaning of the law giver, and to avoid substituting his own values for
those of the latter, the question remains whether it is possible; is neu-
trality attainable or is augmentation or modification of the values ex-
pressed, in that which is being interpreted, by imposition of the values
of the interpreter, inevitable?
Perhaps the ideal is somewhat achievable if neutrality itself may be
regarded as a value factor influencing decision. Might not the welter of
13. Dewey, Democracy and Educational Administration, 45 SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 457,
458 (1937); and reproduced in part in 2 CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION STAFF OF COLUMBIA
COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION IN THE WEST
1018-23 (2d ed. 1954). In this essay Dewey asserts that mechanisms such as popular par-
ticipation, through elected representatives, in the public administration of the laws, are
the very minimal credentials a society must possess to qualify as democratic.
14. This characterization becomes somewhat blurred in view of the fact that in cer-
tain cases judges are popularly elected. But even in such instances their selection does not
revolve about profession of values and is thus not a typical political choice. Indeed, in
most cases, the customary political trappings are to be scrupulously avoided. The effect
is often to manifest the apolitical bases of selection. And if subsequent to selection the
chosen function politically by imposing their values on the society which has never
passed, on such. values the, principles of democracy are betrayed.
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value elements through which a decision maker's decision is strained
include as one referrent a "disposition to neutrality"?, Such a disposi-
tion to neutrality element might be defined as a strong impulse to
interpret in a manner congruent with the interpretations which would
be rendered by those having no interest in the consequences of the in-
terpretation, other than its correctness, despite the existence of other
impulses impelling toward another or contrary interpretation because
of the personal benefits, extrinsic to being accurate, the consequences
flowing from such other interpretation would confer. In not so rigor-
ous, but much plainer, language such a disposition to neutrality factor
might be thought of as pushing a person to gauge the meaning of
language written by another as most men, without any axes to grind,
would understand the language even though the person in question
might stand to substantially benefit, materially, for example, if the
language were deemed to say something different from what dis-
interested observers would read it as stating.
Perhaps an illustration might better bring the concept into relief.
Assume the necessity to interpret the verbal configuration "x."
Assume further that "x" may be reasonably interpreted to imply either
"a" or "b," each of the latter itself implying a separate set of economic
consequences. All members of the set of persons D1, D2, D3 ... D,, each
of whom has something to gain economically if "x" implies "a," inter-
pret "x" as "x implies a." All members of the set of persons E1, E2, E3
... En each of whom stands to benefit economically if "x" implies "b"
interpret "x" as "x implies b." All members of the set of persons F1, F2,
F3 . . . Fn each of whom has no apparent advantage to gain from "x"
being interpreted as implying either "a" or "b" interpret "x" to mean
"x implies b." On these hypotheses would it not be fair to suggest that
objectively viewed "x" implies "b." When essentially the only value
determinant operative in the interpretive process was the disposition to
rationalize, to be logical, to perceive accurately (i.e. when only "dis-
interested" interpreters were at work), "x" was found to mean "b."
Now assume the following modification in the above hypothesis:
The great preponderance, but not all of the persons in the set of
persons D1, D2, D, . .. D- interpret "x" as "x implies a"; a relatively
15. This terminology is not maintained consistently throughout the remainder of the
paper because just what it is that promotes or results in objective human judgment is
far from clear. The principal thrust is the assertion that in the congeries of impulses,
relations, etc. that compose an individual's personality there is a push toward accuracy
in rendition of data.
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few interpret '' as "x implies b" notwithstanding that "a" is much
preferable to "b" in terms of their own personal economic posture.
Might not this small dissenting sub-set of persons be classified as ob-
jective respecting the problem of interpreting the operational meaning
of "x?" To be sure, their interpretation was as value directed as the
interpretations which were offered by the economic motivists. How-
ever, the value controlling the interpretation, of the dissenters was
utter fidelity to the meaning of "x" as contemplated by the entity
which formulated "x"; and is not that the point-that a disposition to
neutrally ascertain meaning is itself an independent value operator.16
To attempt to further clarify in practical terms: Assume "x" as a
phrase in an anti-trust statute declaring illegal certain "combinations
in restraint of trade"; the set of persons D1, D2, D3 ... D. as proprietors
of businesses each of which has just acquired all the assets of a business
formerly in competition with the acquiring businesses; the set of per-
sons El, E2, E3 ... E, as proprietors of businesses in competition with
those businesses owned by the persons in set Dx, D2, D3 ... Dn; F1, F2,
F3 . . . F. as a set of persons who neither buy anything from, or sell
anything to, or work for any of the business owned by any of the
persons in the sets El, E2, E3 . . E,, and D1, D2, D3 .. . D.; "a" as a
finding that the acquisitions made by the business owned by the set
of persons D1, D2, D3 . ..D. did not generate "combinations in re-
straint of trade"; "b" as a finding that such acquisitions did produce
the proscribed effect; and the interpretation by the sub-set of dissenters
of the set Di, D2, D3 . - . D, of "x" as "x implies b" a finding that the
acquisitions which are to their economic advantages are illegal, because
proscribed by those who authoritatively formulated "x," and thus sub-
ject to being set aside. And if some of those who stand to gain from
permission of the acquisitions acknowledge that prohibition rather
than authorization has been directed by the legislature and that they
shall have to contest with their competitors (E,, E2, E3 . . . E.) absent
the advantage control of the assets of the acquired businesses would
have given them, may it not be said that a disposition to judge objec-
tively and neutrally manifested itself?
Even those distinguished observers most conscious of the subjectivity
16. It is possible to contend that the dissenters may have been motivated to their
atypical interpretation by factors having nothing to do with a sense of objectivity, e.g.
psychological disorders prompting masochistic reactions. But unless this is the reason all
the dissenters deviated (the denial of which proposition rests on the faith on which all
axioms are posed) the point as to a disposition to neutrality component of at least some
human personalities holds.
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of decision making seem to recognize with equal acuteness that objec-
tivity may nevertheless inhere in the process to some degree and that
it may perhaps be magnified by the application of certain techniques.
Thus Harold Lasswell, in Self Analysis And Judicial Thinking,'7 in
speculating about "logical thought" refers to it as a:
guided form of mental operation... not something clearly marked
off from impulse, but rather a progressive elaboration and differ-
entiation of impulse. It proceeds by the affirmation of a starting
point, whose distinctive peculiarity is that it is in fact a vague
indication of the goal to be reached, and develops by the criticism
of the material which appears in consciousness according to its
relevance to the end in view .... 1s
Yet in the same article he remarks "The absence of effective logic is a
symptom of a disease which logic itself cannot cure" [emphasis mine]' 9
and that:
Quite a different technique of thinking is needed to get on with
the task of ridding the mind of the distorting results of unseen
compulsions . . . logical thinking is but one of the methods of
using the mind, and cannot itself achieve an adequate inspection
of reality because it cannot achieve self-knowledge without the aid
of other forms of thinking [emphasis added]. 20
Implicit in each of these latter comments is the suggestion that objectiv-
ity is attainable although frequently unattained because of the mind
not having had applied to it a technique [free fantasy] which could
liberate it for neutral operation. Presumably, even currently, minds are
"diseased" to varying degrees so that some are more objective than
others prior to treatment (or perhaps, additionally, because some have
already been treated while the mass has not).
Indeed the disposition to neutrality as an independent value opera-
tor in the skein of interpretive determinants may be fairly easily
isolated in certain contexts.
Suppose three boys, A, B, and C, who are walking together, find two
tickets to today's ball game. All exhibit the highest enthusiasm to
attend but there is obviously one ticket too few. A then proposes the
following arrangement: On two of three pieces of paper an "X" be
written, that after the marks are made each of the pieces of paper be
17. Lasswell, Self Analysis and Judicial Thinking, 40 INT'L J. ETHICS 354 (1930).
18. Id. at 357.
19. Id. at 356.
20. Id. at 356-57.
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folded over to conceal what if. anything is written on it, that all three
pieces of paper so folded. be placed in a hat, and that C and then B
and then A each draw out one of the papers, the two boys winding up
with papers marked with an X to go to the game. Suppose that after
the mechanics are taken care of selection begins with C picking a paper
having an X on it, and with B drawing a paper that is blank. At this
point in view of B's having comprehended the arrangement proposed
by A and in view of that operator in B's value framework which dis-
poses him to perceive objectively, would B, despite the intense prod-
ding of the determinant in his value framework which impels him to
maximize his own material enjoyment (see the ball game) dare contend
that he is entitled to one of the free tickets? It may be said that B is
compelled to abide by the result his disposition to judge neutrally
pushes him toward, due to the relative lack of ambiguity in the situa-
tion; but such commentary nevertheless implicitly admits the inde-
pendent existence of such a disposition to neutrality element in the
interpretive complex.
The point may be seen in a formal judicial context by assuming
that Q is a business in bankruptcy proceedings and that A, B and C
are its three creditors and that a relevant statute proclaims that in such
situations A's claim is to be satisfied prior to B's and that B's claim is
to be satisfied prior to C's. Would it be possible for any judge to accord
C's claim priority over either or both of the other two, regardless of
whatever value preferences the judge might possess for those in C's
category (e.g. wage earners) over those in A and B's categories (e.g.
suppliers who are general creditors, and secured creditors)? In a rela-
tively unequivocal situation the disposition to decide neutrally assumes
controlling proportions-which suggests its presence in all human
decision making situations although its potency may be inversely pro-
portional to the complexity of that as to which a decision is being
rendered.
And just as individuals vary in the strength of other value drives-
e.g. some persons are more concerned with the enjoyment they derive
from food than others-and some persons manifest more economic
acquisitiveness than others, are not some persons more disposed to
judge neutrally than others-to be able to accurately perceive the
operational consequences intended. by those who sought to direct such
consequences through verbal formulation, and to be controlled by such
perceptions in rendering their judgments as to what, indeed, was
254
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intended? And if there is value, to a democratic society, in the law
interpreters adhering as accurately as possible to the intentions of the
law givers is it not these persons with well developed dispositions to
act neutrally who should be our judges?
In this day when measurement of all varieties of things accelerates
toward fetishtic proportions can we perhaps aspire to measure the
disposition to neutrality element in the infinity of matter and mind
that is a human being? Conceptualization of at least crude types
of such gauges is possible. Suppose each member of a group of persons
of perfect eyesight is given a sheet of paper with 5/8 of the surface red
and 3/. of the surface green. Suppose this conclusion is clear in the
sense, and to the extent that, 100 persons of perfect eyesight, but other-
wise selected at random, all replied "more red" to the query "Is this
paper 'more red' or 'more green?'" Suppose that the persons who
have been given such sheets of paper are told to answer the next
question that they are asked honestly and that $100 will be given to
anyone whose honest response is "more green." Then suppose that
each person in the group is asked whether the sheet of paper he has
been given is more red or more green. Would not those whose re-
sponse was "more green" reveal themselves as possessing a less well
developed "sense of objectivity" than those who sacrificed the monetary
reward to respond truthfully.21 Clearly this test is neither sufficiently
refined nor particularly revealing in any comprehensive sense, but
perhaps it suggests that the ultimate ideal may be attainable.
And indeed speculation respecting highly accurate methods for
evaluating a person's capacity for objectivity is, considering the highly
developed state of modern science, perhaps not unwarranted. If it is
more and more possible to correlate mental disorders with specific
physiological symptoms 22 perhaps traits such as objectivity are similarly
21. Of course to ensure the accuracy of a determination made as a result of such a
procedure the subjects would have to be totally unaware that there might be some
reward (e.g. consideration for a judgeship) for those found to be "objective."
22. R. Molmo, Physiological Concomitants of Emotion, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY § 29.4 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1967). The following passages
appear at 1045-47:
In general the intensity of an emotional reaction may be gauged by recording various
physiological measures. . . . In general the stronger the emotion, the greater is the
overall physiological activation. Physiological recordings that have been successfully
taken from human subjects during psychiatric interview or under similar conditions
include the following measures: cardiovascular, respiratory, skin conductance, gastro-
intestinal...
From Freud's treatment of the problem of anxiety to the present, physiological
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discernible via physio-chemical tests. For example, once a manifestation
of objectivity is considered to have been isolated, as perhaps in the
case of those who deferred monetary gain in the example above, in
order to respond truthfully, an observation and cataloging of distinc-
tive accompanying physiological symptoms might be possible. Such a
procedure might suggest certain physio-chemical characteristics present
in those possessed of a well developed disposition to objectivity of
judgment. And subsequently those found to have such physio-chemical
characteristics could be presumed as endowed with the capacity to
judge impartially.
The discussion of neutrality embodied here has deliberately been
placed in a context more discursive than that of constitutional adjudi-
overactivation is cited as an objective accompaniment of anxiety ...
Examples of other kinds of physiological dysfunction that were observed in anxiety
patients . . . are the following: irregularities in motor action, such as finger tremor
and respiratory irregularity, and autonomic nervous system overreactivity such as
reactions of blood pressure and heart rate ...
In Cleghorn and McClure, Endocrines, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY,
id. § 39.9 at 1091 the following appears:
Pershky et al.... found that radioactive cortisol had a higher turnover rate in those
with anxiety than in normal persons, indicating that cortisol is produced in larger
amounts and metabolized faster in anxious subjects.
[I]t has been shown by Bliss et al. that acute schizophrenics who are emotionally
disturbed appear to have elevated plasma cortisol levels ...
[T]he Michael Rees group . . . findings showed elevation of 17-hydroxycorticosteroid
levels in the plasma; the more severe the depression the higher the corticosteroid
levels. Higher cortisol values were seen in the retarded depressions than in the
agitated ones ...
Rizzo et al. found low urinary glucocortioids in a manic-depressive female patient
during her hyperactive episodes, with the levels returning to normal after clinical
recovery ...
Elmadjian, Hope and Lamson, EXCRETION OF EPINEPHRINE AND NOREPINEPHRINE IN VARI-
OUS EMOTIONAL STATES, 17 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY AND METABOLISM 608 (1957) set
forth the following model:
A study was undertaken to determine the excretion of epinephrine (E) and norepi-
nephrine (NE) of normal and psychiatric patients in various emotional states ...
The excretion rates of E and NE were studied after graded doses of E and NE were
infused. These data were used to estimate the secretion of the amines in the various
stress conditions studied.
At 619 the results were summarized:
The results support the hypothesis that active, aggressive emotional displays are
related to increased excretion of NE with or without increased excretion of E whereas
tense, anxious but passive emotional displays are related to increased excretion of
E in association with normal excretion of NE.
And in Freedhoff and van Winkle, A Biochemical Approach to the Study of Schizo-
phrenia, 121 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 1054 (1965) the following appears:
[Slamples of urine were collected from 19 schizophrenic patients and 14 non-
schizophrenic controls ...
Urine samples were subjected to extraction and paper chromatographic separation.
As a result of these procedures an amine was found in about 70% of schizophrenic
patients which was not present in any of the normal controls. We developed a
specific test . . . and with the aid of this procedure . . . identified the compound
found in schizophrenic urine. . . . 3,4-dimethoxyphenylethylamine. ...
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cation. The suggestion has been that such neutrality is a vital element
in the general process of adjudication of disputes involving an inter-
pretation of legislative directions, i.e. statutes. It is on the stage of this
premise-that judicial neutrality of interpretation of the legislature's
value judgments is essential to the proper proportioning of a demo-
cratic polity-that it is urged that the quest for objective judges is an
important enterprise.
257
